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ABSTRACT
Since the term “privatization” was given wide currency by the sale of 
British Telecom in 1984, many developing countries have launched 
privatization programs. The dimensions of the privatization revolution have 
been huge. The most profound change of all has been experienced in Eastern 
Europe after the fall of communism, which have adopted a variety of 
techniques to transfer ownership rapidly to private hands.
A very important key obstacle results from the legacy of communism: 
there was no existing private sector to buy the state-owned enterprises. In 
Western Europe and Latin America, , there has been a private sector capable 
of buying and managing state-owned enterprises, but this was not the case in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This meant that the economic and political 
leaders had to create their own mechanism to achieve privatization. Thus, to 
make a market economy out of the ruins of Communism faced an incredibly 
complicated task. They had to create a “private economy” where there was no 
pre-existing social group of “private owners”.
The primary purpose of this thesis is the evaluation of the privatization 
experience of Eastern Europe in the post-communist period by showing the 
crucial interrelations between market reforms and democratic political 
reforms. The policies of post-communist governments -liberalization and 
privatization- were intended to allow “efficiency” considerations to shape 
organizations of the new capitalist economies.
ÖZET
Liberal anlayış çerçevesinde en geniş anlamda, devletin ekonomiye 
müdahalesinin asgari düzeye indirilmesi olarak izah edilebilecek olan 
özelleştirme, 1984 yılında British Telecom’un özelleştirilmesi sonrası 
gelişmekte olan ülkelerce benimsenmiştir. Boyutları çok geniş olarak 
gerçekleşen sözkonusu süreci. Komünizmin çöküşü sonrası Doğu Avrupa 
ülkeleri fazlasıyla benimsemiş ve devlet teşeküllerinin süratle özel sektöre 
devredilmesi için gerekli yöntemleri uygulamışlardır.
Kapitalizme geçiş sürecinde, özelleştirmenin önünde duran önemli 
engellerden bir tanesi, satılacak olan kuruluşları satın alabilecek bir özel 
sektörün bulunmaması idi. Özelleştirmeyi gerçekleştiren Batı Avrupa ve Latin 
Amerika ülkelerinde, devlet tarafından elden çıkarılmak istenen kuruluşları 
satın alabilecek ve sonrasında yönetecek kapasiteye sahip bir özel sektör 
bulunmaktaydı. Doğu Avrupa’da ise böyle bir durum mevzu bahis değildi. Bu 
da, ekonomik ve siyasi liderlerin yeni bazı mekanizmalar bularak 
özelleştirmeyi gerçekleştirmeleri anlamına geliyordu.
Bu tezin temel amacı. Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinde komünizmden 
kapitalizme geçiş sürecinde gerçekleştirilen özelleştirme deneyimini, piyasa 
ve demokratik reformalar arasındaki önemli ilişkiyi vurgulayarak incelemek ve 
konu hakkında genel bir değerlendirme yapmaktır.
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Introduction
During the past eight years the states of Central and Eastern Europe 
have been struggling with a most daunting and unique task which is 
transforming a centralized economy into a market economy. In this transition 
from an economic system based on state ownership and centralized control of 
production and prices, privatization plays a key role. “Therefore, the stakes of 
getting the privatization process right are far higher than those faced by the 
states of Western Europe or Latin America.^
Why is privatization an important aspect of economic reform? In simple 
terms, privatization can improve economic performance and help promote 
domestic and foreign private investment—the lifeblood of reforming countries 
in the modern global economy. It also provides new economic opportunities 
for individuals, who can become investors or owners in former state-owned 
companies. In other words, privatization benefits the public and private 
sectors and consumers, not just the State Owned Enterprises (SOE)’s that 
are privatized.
D. Jeffrey Manners, “Looking at Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe”. p .l2
Privatization represents a potential revolution in the role of government 
in promoting economic growth and development—and in its role in society as 
a whole. This revolution, which has gained strength throughout since the 
1980s, continues to gather momentum.
To understand just how important privatization programs have been as 
agents of economic change, consider the following key points:
• Less than ten years after the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, state ownership in former 
communist countries has been dramatically reduced. The state sector 
today represents less than half of the economies of Eastern Europe, 
and less than 30% of Russia's economy. Although the methods that 
have brought about this transformation have often been controversial, it 
is generally believed that privatization is now irreversible.
• Since 1988 over 70 countries have used direct asset sales as a 
method of divesting state-owned firms. These sales have raised over 
$175 billion through more than 800 individual transactions. The direct 
sale of SOEs to either foreign-owned investors or corporations brings 
the divesting government much-needed cash, and may often involve 
an injection of foreign technology and expertise.
• Since 1979 over 60 national governments have raised almost $500 
billion through about 600 separate public sales of stock in SOEs. 
These share-issue privatizations have almost always been the largest 
share issues in a nation's history, and have often both radically
increased the number of individual shareholders and increased the 
liquidity and total capitalization of the nation's stock market.
The chief reason that governments increasingly choose to privatize 
SOEs is clear. Governments have been selling SOEs to private investors in 
order to improve these firms' performance through the discipline of private 
ownership, as well as to raise revenue without raising taxes. The specific 
objectives articulated for privatization programs are often very ambitious, and 
most tend to mirror the goals voiced by Margaret Thatcher's government 
during the early 1980s. These objectives are to: (1) raise new revenue for the 
state; (2) promote economic efficiency; (3) reduce government interference in 
the economy; (4) promote wider share-ownership; (5) provide the opportunity 
to introduce competition; and (6) develop the nation's capital markets.
Facing the economic consequences of their heavy reliance on state- 
owned enterprises, many developing countries have adopted new economic 
programs, featuring lower barriers to trade and foreign investment and other 
measures designed to promote competition and strengthen their private 
sectors. In Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, the collapse of 
socialism has likewise prompted fundamental transitions toward market 
economies based on private property and private-sector development. For 
both of these groups of countries, recent experience clearly demonstrates that 
privatization is closely linked to economic and political reform, and that it can 
serve as an important indicator of a government's commitment to reform.
Fundamentally, reformers in these countries recognize the importance 
of privatization in revamping their economic and industrial structures. 
Privatization both represents and embodies the economic revolution that they 
are attempting to bring about.
In this context, I will analyze the very important role of privatization 
during the transformation period in Eastern Europe. The main concern of this 
thesis is privatization in Eastern Europe and its role in the transition to a 
market economy in this region. I will try to emphasise the struggle in Eastern 
Europe to build capitalism on the ruins of communism. Within this framework 
the study aims to explain the impacts of privatization for their overriding goal 
of integrating with the western capitalist system.
Scope of the Study
This study consists of four chapters. In the First Chapter, a definition of 
the meaning of privatization will be given along with the role of privatization 
during the transition from socialism in Eastern Europe. In the Second Chapter, 
the general framework of privatization in Eastern Europe will be explained by 
emphasizing the problems of transformation of centrally planned economies 
into market economies and their social and political impacts. In the Third 
Chapter, there will be a case study to explain and specify the hypotheses. The 
impact of the privatization on the transition economies. Reflection on the 
promise of promoting economic growth. In the concluding chapter, a general 
evaluation of the East European case will be made in relation to some results
in the region and the situation today will be investigated. This will be followed 
by a conclusion to sum up the thesis
1. Privatization and Transition from Socialism
to Capitalism in Eastern Europe
Privatization constitutes an important aspect of social, economic and 
political transformation in the late twentieth century. Over the last decade it 
has moved from being a little known technical term to a touchstone of 
economic development. The one-time unthinkable loss of state control over 
strategic assets such as transport and power has now become the norm, with 
a new consensus looking to the private sector for the efficient operation and 
investment of the infrastructure of the economy.^
In response to economic crisis, we see the renaissance of “laissez 
faire” ideology. In this context, privatization has become the main tool to 
reduce the role of the state in the economic domain, as a deep ideological 
movement toward decreasing the role of the government and increasing that 
of the private sector.
 ^The Official Publication of Turkish Prime Ministry, Privatization Administration, Privatization in 
Turkey. December 1999, p.2
The 1980s were the decade of debt crisis and capital shortage for 
many developing countries. The 1990s by contrast, have so far been a period 
of renewed private capital inflows. This boom in private investment has been 
the result of widespread macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization. Many 
developing countries want to improve their international competitiveness and 
are keen to provide a more attractive business climate for private economic 
activity. One particularly important component of this liberalization effort is a 
strong move toward reducing the size of the public sector.^
Most developing countries did not implement privatization as a tool of 
macroeconomic liberalization before the late 1980s. Since then however, 
privatization has grown strong in a rapidly expanding number of countries. 
This development has helped to create an attractive business environment in 
many developing countries and has intensified the interest of foreign 
investors.
Privatization has grown rapidly since 1988. At the same time, however 
there exist substantial differences among individual countries and regions 
regarding the intensity with which this policy has been pursued. This study 
shows that privatization can serve as an important tool for raising inflows of 
foreign investment into the developing economies of the countries. First of all, 
foreign investors participated directly in sizeable and easily accessible 
privatization programs. Additionally, well-run privatization programs also 
appear to have attracted additional investment flows abroad, independent of
' Henrj' Gibbon, Privatization International Yearbook 1996. p. 13
the privatization program itself by advertising the country as an attractive 
investment location.
Privatization is a reduction in government ownership of the means of 
production. At the national level, to privatize an industry is to denationalize it, 
in contrast to nationalization, which is to bring the industry under government 
ownership. In post- World War II Britain, many industries (including steel, coal, 
mining, railroads) were nationalized by the Labor Party governments and 
several were denationalized later under the Conservatives.
The U.K. and the U.S.A have been the leaders of the privatization 
movement. In the U.K. the government's commitment to a private market 
philosophy has led to a series of proposals or decisions designed to replace 
the “welfare state’’ systems of collective provision and finance with more 
privatized systems since 1979. Privatization first gained prominence in the 
United Kingdom under the leadership of Mrs. Thatcher’s conservative 
government. It has been notable both in scale and its high national and 
international profile."* Later on the trend toward privatization appeared to grow 
world-wide as the privatization policies were embraced as enthusiastically by 
the labor governments of Australia and New Zealand as they have been by 
some of conservative governments of Western Europe, as well as the Eastern 
European countries.
Ibid., p.23
Privatization, although initiated in the mature western economies, 
quickly spread to the developing world mainly under the driving force of the 
strong support from the international institutions like. The International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). These institutions have induced many countries to reduce public 
expenditures and to adopt policies that would foster efficient use of the 
resources and bring about growth within the framework or stabilization 
policies. Thus, privatization and the reform of State Economic Enterprises 
(SEEs) have appeared to be new policy tools, which could be helpful in the 
realization of the above policies.
The term privatization was put into common usage by Robert Poole at 
the Reason Foundation in California, in 1976. Presidential aspirant Ronald 
Reagan soon began using the term in his radio broadcasts. In its purest form, 
privatization means selling off an entire government enterprise into 
unregulated private ownership. Some governments, however, sell off a 
minority stake in a government enterprise and call that privatization. It is 
common also to call the “contracting out” by the government for a service, 
such as trash removal, privatization. Contracting out allows the private 
ownership of resources, while government decides how the service is to be 
rendered, who will get, and perhaps also who will perform the service. Under 
contracting out, the service continues to be paid for by %50 tax revenues, 
rather than by user fees.
The main philosophy of privatization is to confine the role of state in the 
economy in areas like health, basic education, social security, national 
defence, large scale infrastructure investments; provide legal and structural 
environment for free enterprise to operate and thus to increase the 
productivity and the value added to the economy by ensuring more efficient 
organisation and management in the enterprises that should be 
commercialised to be competitive in the market.
The major targets of the privatization programs are primarily:^
• to minimize state involvement in the industrial and commercial activities of 
the economy,
• to provide legal and structural environment for free enterprises to operate,
• to decrease the financial burden of State Economic enterprises on the 
national budget,
• to transfer privatization revenues to the major infrastructure projects
• to expand and deepen the existing capital market by promoting wider 
share ownership,
• to provide efficient allocation of resources.
In the 1980s a strong worldwide governmental trend in favour of 
privatization developed. In many cases rhetoric far exceeded action, but a 
number of countries did sell off all or a substantial part of some government
 ^The Official Publication of Turkish Prime Ministry, Privatization Administration, op.cit, p.2
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enterprises, and many services out to private firms. The British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s government, after its election in 1979, began to sell 
public holdings in several industries, including telecommunications. In the 
United States, the Reagan administration led an advocacy campaign, 
although state and local governments quietly took more action, mainly in the 
form of contracting out. Taxpayer revolts had early on reduced state and local 
government tax revenues, and the governments sought to reduce costs.
At the same time, airlines were sold by the Netherlands, Malaysia, 
Italy, and Thailand. Germany, Brazil, and Britain sold oil interests. The 
government of the Philippines sold hotels, sugar and coconut mills, and 
cement plants. Britain sold car and truck companies. The same events 
occurred in Spain. Chile sold banks and pension funds. And even the 
communist Cuban government sold housing to tenants.
Proponents of privatization argue that firms and assets owned by and 
operated in the private sector will generally be more efficient and more 
responsive to the needs of the public than those which are government owned 
and operated. They point out that effective political pressures often reflect 
much narrower interests than the public interest. For example, if an electric 
marketing company is publicly owned then customers will demand subsidized 
low rates, and politicians are likely to dip into the public treasury to deliver 
such favors.
11
At the managerial level, costs will be higher than in the private sector, 
since the discipline of competition and potential wealth loss by owners even 
the possibility of bankruptcy are missing. Without the opportunity to grow 
richer by finding and applying cheaper, more productive ways to deliver their 
goods and services, governmental managers have less incentive to be alert 
and tough in their efforts to operate efficiently. There is evidence that 
government enterprises exhibit these faults. Privatization would change the 
incentives facing owners and managers causing them to deliver more at a 
lower cost.®
On the other hand opponents of privatization point out that, 
privatization is no guarantee of improvement, and make specific situations 
worse. Politics and business are generally related, and if private monopoly is 
protected from competition by government or from losses by government 
subsidies or loans, then market discipline is missing. Corruption is always 
possible, and a private corrupt operation may be even harder to improve than 
if the firm were directly responsible politically, through government ownership. 
Private ownership alone guarantees very little. Freedom of entry and true 
financial accountability on the part of owners is necessary if private ownership 
is to be efficient. The opposite group also note that the move towards 
efficiency can itself be painful, since it may involve a reduction in jobs, a rise 
in previously subsidized prices, or a reduction in the availability of services 
when customers cannot or will not pay the full cost. Those who believe that 
government has a responsibility to subsidize housing, medical care, or
' John Sherrod, Privatization, p.74
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schooling may favour only partial privatization as in contracting out. In the 
latter case, tax revenues finance all part of the consumer purchase from the 
private sector, and government retains some role in specifying the goods or 
services consumed.^
Governments have privatized to increase the size and dynamism of the 
private sector; to distribute ownership more widely to the population at large; 
to encourage and facilitate private sector investment, from both domestic and 
foreign sources, for modernization; to generate revenues for the state; to 
reduce the administrative burden on the state and to have a perfect free 
market model.The main requirements of a successful privatization program 
are the speed of implementation, social and political acceptability, 
establishment of working corporate governance arrangements, and the 
facilitation of access to foreign capital and expertise.
Another important advantage of privatization is transparency. This 
means, competitive bidding procedures, clear criteria for evaluating bids, 
disclosure of purchase price and buyer, well-defined institutional 
responsibilities, and adequate monitoring of the program.
The former communist countries adapted privatization very easily and 
rapidly. This is because, privatization in these countries has not been a simple
' Frank Sader, Privatizing Public Enterprises and Foreign Investment, p. 156
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change of ownership but rather a complex social and political transformation.® 
Moreover, privatization in Eastern Europe is not just a goal for a market 
oriented economic reform. It is also a process to assist the transformation 
from communist structures to liberal democracies.
It has been said many times that the fall of communism in 1989 came 
to many as a big surprise. What was really surprising was not just the fall of 
communism but the relatively peaceful way that the communists gave up 
power in most of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The tasks facing the 
region in order to create liberal democracies and market economies seemed 
enormous. Some people cautioned that the economic transformation will 
involve enormous social cost, for example Ralph Dehrendorf described it as 
crossing the “valley of tears”. According to some social scientists, “the future 
of most of Eastern Europe is more likely to resemble Latin America than
Western Europe» 9
The first seven years of transition confirmed many of these initial fears 
and depressed predictions. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the bloody civil 
war that followed became symbols of the danger inherent in abandoning 
communist dictatorship. Economic transition proved to be a costly process. 
The liberalization of the region’s economies resulted in growing 
unemployment, inflation, poverty and rising inequality.
Roman Frydinan, Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern Europe, p. 11
14
Despite these obvious problems, the transformation unfolding in the 
region must be judged as surprisingly successful. New states emerged 
without civil wars. Democratic institutions have been introduced, lawfully 
elected parliaments and governments have gained power.Political rights 
and liberties were expanded, free media emerged, and new civil societies 
developed rapidly.
Together with political life, state run economies were transformed. 
These countries introduced more comprehensive macro-economic 
stabilization reforms, liberalized the economy, and privatized a large part of 
state-owned assets. Most of the countries have renewed economic growth, 
reduced inflation, stabilized unemployment, rationalized fiscal policies, and 
secured foreign aid and investment. Especially in the Visegrad countries, 
economic transformations have been quite successful, regardless of 
continuing problems. In these countries, economic reforms are most 
advanced and liberal democracy is most secure.
The collapse of the Communist regime opened the way for the eager 
construction of a new system to be built on the pillars of political democracy, a 
market economy and an open society. Creating a market driven economy 
(and a political democracy) is not just about abandoning state regulations and 
controls and capacity for action, distributing shares in giant monopolies and 
running elections. It is first of all, about building institutions. And the core of 
the East European success is in institution building, especially the key
^ Ralph Dalircndorf, Reflection on the Revolution in Europe, p.56 
Grzegorz Eklert, Patterns o f Postcomnuinist Transition in Eastern Europe, p. 1
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institution, a functioning state. The creation of stable and effective public 
administration is the key step to\A/ard the creation of a successful capitalist 
market system and a functioning democracy.
Privatization -  the process which transfers state-owned assets to 
private owners -  has been the core policy of economic liberalization in 
Eastern Europe. Especially, western advisers presumed that private owners 
are at once the basis for a market economy and democracy and the main 
instrument to break the economic and political power of the state. The choices 
of the radical privatizers rested on a very particular theory of economy and 
politics in which the mere fact of private property would generate functioning
markets and liberal politics 12
According to neo-liberals, privatization is the bridge from Communism 
to Capitalism. Two famous neo-liberals, Graham Allison and Grigory 
Yavlinsky, wrote in 1991,
‘In economics, the core value of freedom is exercised in a market 
economy based on private ownership in which market forces of supply and 
demand answer the question of who produces what for whom. ..Ownership 
means the freedom to use and dispose of property as an individual chooses.
'' Stephen Cohen, Andrew Schwzrtz and Jolm Zysinan, The Tumiel at die End o f the light: 
Privatization Business Development, and Economic Transformation in Russia., p .l34  
Andrew Schwartz, The Best Laid Plan: The Unanticipated Evolution o f Privatization in tlie Czech 
Republic, p.56
16
Basic laws of economics tolerate no equivocation on this point, none 
whatsoever.
The immediate neo-liberal objective of privatization is to create first 
private owners, not just private owners. This distinction stresses that the first 
private owners created by privatization are temporary owners; it is the last 
owners who will restructure companies and lead the move to democracy.
Market logic in a system of private ownership automatically will create 
the active private owners that enable free markets to produce prosperity and 
democracy. First private owners sell to intermediate private owners. Neo­
liberals pay no attention to the market experience, skills, or attitudes of the 
first owners. They contend that the first owners, whoever they were, would be 
“economic” men, though they had lived under a state socialist system for 
decades. Neo-liberals only have disdain for first owners, such as workers, 
who would have obvious non-market incentives in a market economy.^'’
Moreover, a private ownership system presumably solves the 
transaction cost problem concerning the protection of private property and the 
lack of reliable market rules. First owners could only get the maximum prices 
for their assets if the active owners knew that property rights were secure, that 
is, if reliable rules were in place. Therefore, first owners have incentives to 
create and to enforce laws and procedures that protect property. In these
Garaliain Allison and Grigory Yavlinsky, Window o f Opportunity. Joint Program for Western 
Cooperation in the Soviet Transformation to Democracy and the Market Economy, p.3 
' '’World Bank, Policy Recommendations on Banks. Capital Markets, and Enterprises Restnictiiring.. 
1994, p.20
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ways, a private ownership system establishes an efficient market economy 
and a modern democracy. Privatization’s clear logic and clarity of purpose 
focused reformers on the task at hand, how to privatize.
The transition’s political opportunities had offered the East European 
reformers a historic chance to privatize. They could act before privatization’s 
likely opponents, who were momentarily disoriented by the Communist 
system collapse, could respond reformers risked a return to the Communist 
past or unthinkable move backward to the Third World by delaying 
privatization. The neo-liberal solution was then obvious, not just privatization, 
but rapid privatization.
Fundamentally, reformers in these countries recognize the importance 
of privatization for developing their economic and industrial structures. 
Privatization represents the economic revolution that they are trying to bring 
about.
The experiences of East Central European countries have been 
surprisingly positive, and their efforts to consolidate democracy, build market 
economies, and join the European political and economic structures look 
increasingly successful. Maybe the situation in the Balkans is not as 
promising. In these countries, the progress of political and economic 
transformation has been slower and less consistent. The policies of post 
communist governments have shifted more. Market reforms have been less 
advanced, privatization has slowed-down. In addition to that, their legal and
18
institutional infrastructure has been less developed and less transparent. 
Political rights and liberties have been less secure and the media are only 
partially free. Ho\A/ever, the Central European countries -  the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia -  scored significantly higher in all indexes. 
Economic transformations in these countries are more advanced as the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) index of 
Transition Progress indicates. Their economies are more open and liberalized 
in comparison to other countries, economic policies are more stable and 
transparent, privatization has had a more consistent record, and large a 
private sector has emerged. And, the quality of democracy in these four 
countries is better as indicated by the Freedom House Index. Democratic 
institutions are not conflicted, political rights and liberties are more extensive 
and secure and the media are free. These countries are also better integrated 
economically and politically with the West and they are members of many 
multilateral organisations.
In most of the post-communist world, transformations so far have 
progressed in the direction of liberal democracy and an open market 
economy. The countries with the most advanced and successful economic 
transformations have at the same time the most secure and effective 
democratic systems. In more successful countries the level of approval of the 
new economic and political system is higher than in less successful countries. 
The timing, continuity, and the scope of reforms is commonly considered as 
the best explanation of more successful economic transition. The World Bank 
analysis supports the view that countries that liberalized rapidly and
19
extensively recover faster and experienced decline in inflation rates.F inally, 
more successful countries in the region introduced more comprehensive 
macro-economic stabilization reforms, liberalized the economy, and privatized 
a large part of state assets.
The most important thing to understand about the privatization process 
in Eastern Europe is that, in contrast to other countries, privatization, in the 
environment of the transitional economies, is not a simple transfer of 
ownership from the state to private individuals, it is rather a process by which 
the very institution of property, in the sense in which lawyers and economists 
employ the term, is reintroduced into East European societies.
Parallel with the breakdown of the communist political system in 
Eastern Europe and the USSR, the privatization of state-owned property 
became the focus of discussion within and outside Eastern Europe. Because, 
this was the best way to replace their broken-down economies. That is why, 
the building of economic and legal mechanisms to put in place of the fallen 
communist system in Eastern Europe is one of the great dramas of the 
century.
This was an obvious development since state-owned property 
accounted for 85-90 percent of national assets of the command economies. 
Private ownership and privatization, which had been a taboo for Eastern 
European economists during the communist era, surfaced as an immediate
15 The World Bank. World Development Report., p.83
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necessity in countries that aimed for an economic and political integration in to 
the West. But the task of turning state-owned assets into privately owned 
properties turned out to be overwhelming. It is perhaps one of the most 
challenging tasks of our time, both intellectually and in practical terms.
In 1989, successive political revolutions affected Europe. The 
communist systems collapsed one after the other and by 1991, all the East 
European countries (from Albania to the USSR and its member republics) 
launched a process for creating a market economy with dominant private 
ownership to replace their broken-down dictate economies.
The problem of privatization in Eastern Europe showed that the 
situation in the region was entirely different from that in the West and that the
solutions adopted there could not be transplanted to Eastern Europe. 17
The transition to capitalism requires the replacement of state 
management with private owners operating under effective corporate 
governance, the clarification of property rights, and the development of 
financial markets.
The most important context in which the emerging order in Eastern 
Europe is shaped is the moral dimension of social activity. Shifting political 
and moral responsibility to the individual has been an important topic of 
reform movements in Eastern Europe. The antidogmatic morality of human
16 Ivan Major, Privatization in Eastern Europe, p. 1 
Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski, op.cit, p .l3
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actions governed by individual rights and dignity informed the slogans of the 
Citizens Forum, Solidarnosc, and the Civic Rights movements. For Vaclac 
Flavel, such a morality stands in opposition to the self-momentum of the 
system, “the blind, unconscious, irresponsible, uncontrollable, and unchecked 
momentum that is no longer the work of the people, but which drags people 
along with it and therefore manipulates them.” ®^
So if the moral dimension is the first important component, the second 
one is privatization which is a systemic dimension. The most important task 
faced by the post communist countries is the development of institutional 
structures that connect the moral dimension with the systemic one. Flere, also 
we see the important role of privatization because privatization is the most 
important connection between the two dimensions.
18
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2. Privatization in Eastern Europe
Since the term “privatization” was given wide currency by the sale of 
British Telecom in 1984, many developing countries have launched 
privatization programs and many more are in process of joining the club.^° 
During the 1980s, the main proponents of privatization were nations of the 
developed world together with a number of Latin American nations. However, 
in the 1990s, the popularity of privatization widened considerably, spurred by 
the transition from communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.
Privatization is now mainstream. The dimensions of the privatization 
revolution have been huge. The most profound change of all has been 
experienced in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union 
after the fall of communism, which have adopted a variety of techniques to 
transfer ownership rapidly to private hands. A very interesting example for 
Eastern European countries is that the average share of national GDP 
attributable to the private sector increased from 20% to more than 50% over 
the three year period from 1990 -  1993.
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The economic benefits of privatization are now widely accepted, and 
may include: improving enterprise efficiency and performance; developing 
competitive industry which serves consumers well; accessing the capital, 
know-how and markets which permit growth; achieving effective corporate 
governance; broadening and deepening capital markets; and of course, 
securing the best price possible for the sale.
Privatization is always political in the sense that governments have 
aims that are non-economic. These can involve, as in the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, the swift transfer of assets to private hands, in the full 
knowledge that the needs of the new owners for assistance in turning the 
enterprises around could be dealt with later on. Other political objectives 
include achieving a wide shareholder distribution, targeting certain classes of 
buyers (and excluding others, particularly foreigners), ensuring that 
enterprises do not close, reducing budget deficits/raising money, and 
maintaining employment and social obligations. There are also political 
impediments to overcome primarily the conservative or sometimes obstructive 
attitudes of existing managers and employees of state-owned businesses, 
who may be afraid of the challenges of the market place.
In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the rapidly 
deteriorating economic conditions translated into a need for speed; the size of 
the economies and the transparent magnitude of the task of transformation 
required a need for replicability. The privatization results in Russia since 1992
"" International Finance Corporation. Privatiziition “Principles & Practice”, p.2
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are an illustration of this: 75,000 small-scale businesses have been auctioned; 
14,000 medium and large scale firms were sold; and 30-40 million new 
shareholders were created. A transformation so fast, and so profound is 
unparalleled in recent times. The speed meant, however, that individual 
appraisal of each transaction was not possible.
In the former socialist economies, enterprise numbers are larger and 
the economic and the social importance of State Economic Enterprises (SOE) 
sectors are far greater than in the rest of the world. Whereas in mixed 
economies privatization is a tool for increasing efficiency, in the former 
socialist economies many view divestiture as an end itself, essential to the 
transformation from a command to a market system.Even at their peak, the 
largest SOE sectors in industrial and mixed economies were small in 
comparison with those in socialist Eastern Europe. At the beginning of the 
1990s enterprise numbers in this region were much larger than anywhere 
else, and SOEs accounted for between two-thirds and nine-tenths of all 
productive economic activity. Indeed, SOEs were not and are not a sector; 
they constitute, in effect, the bulk of the nonagricultural economy.
In the past, impressive production figures were reported for SOEs in 
most command economies. Methods of production, however, were inefficient, 
and the goods produced were generally poor in quality and incapable of 
competing in export markets. Despite persistent partial reform efforts from the 
1960s onward, the SOE’s never achieved the efficiency and productivity level
Sunita Kikeri, Privatization Tlie Lessons o f Experience, p.73
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expected of them, and their performance deteriorated sharply in the period 
1970 -89. Dissatisfaction with the insufficient results of past partial reforms 
and the contribution of inefficient SOEs to stagnating or even declining 
standards of living contributed to the political economic upheaval of the past 
several years and to a widespread enthusiasm for privatization. All the 
successor governments in the region have already launched or are planning 
privatizations.
Privatization in the former socialist countries differs greatly from that 
elsewhere. First, it is a more massive and thus a more complex undertaking. 
For example, the governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Hungary, Poland, 
and Romania have announced intentions to privatize between third and a half 
of their SOEs within a three-year period. At a conservative estimate, this 
amounts to more than 8,000 firms. In the 1990s the former German 
Democratic Republic has privatized more enterprises than the rest of the 
world in the past fifteen years.
Second, the context is very different. In even the poorest or least 
market-oriented developing country there is always a private sector. This has 
not been the case in the former socialist countries.
Third, In mixed economies privatization is seen primarily as a tool for 
enhancing efficiency and reducing budgetary burdens. In contrast, in the 
former socialist economies there is a strong argument that privatization is an 
end in itself because it is the principal mechanism for moving the society from
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communism to capitalism. Its overriding purpose is to transfer property rights 
to owners who have incentives for defending the interests of the capital they 
own. Private owners are expected to support with their votes and their actions 
the painful steps necessary for transformorming to a market economy. For the 
transition to succeed, privatization must be massive.
There is near-universal agreement in these countries on the goal of 
creating a large and influential group of property owners. Some go further and 
insist that the property transfer must be accomplished immediately, since 
many key decisions that will determine the nature of the postcommunist 
system are being made now.^^ The fear is that if privatization does not come 
quickly, it will take years for any substantial portion of assets to pass into 
private hands. And in the interim, a base could be constituted for those who 
see interventionist populism as the less-painful alternative to free market 
economics.
Other respected reformers argue that since “the principal purpose of 
privatization is to nurture the incentive force private ownership provides,” each 
transaction should be structured to yield the maximum possible amount of 
macroeconomic and microeconomic gain and ” the sale of state property 
should not be governed by the guiding principle of speed”^^  I believe, this view 
is more common in countries that had a more evolutionary than revolutionary 
break with communism; in these circumstances leaders are less likely to 
regard massive and rapid privatization as essential. For example, in Hungary,
"  Ibid.,p.74
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management buyouts are the main privatization method. In contrast, in the 
Czech Republic the great majority of firms are to be privatized by a “voucher” 
method that emphasizes speed and aims at the rapid elimination of 
government involvement in the enterprise sector.
A very important thing to understand about the privatization process in 
Eastern Europe is that, in contrast to other countries, privatization, in the 
environment of the transitional economies, is not a simple transfer of 
ownership from the state to private individuals. It is rather a process by which 
the very institution of property, in the sense in which lawyers and economists 
employ the term, is reintroduced into East European societies.^"^
The socialist economies of Eastern Europe did not have any property 
system governing their productive activities'^ That is why, in all East 
European countries, it is nearly impossible to answer the simple question of 
who owns what in the state enterprises: the legal determination of ownership 
was simply irrelevant under the old system, which relied instead on directly 
prescribing the conduct of factor officials. The need to reintroduce the very 
institution of property in the productive resources of East European societies 
means that structural reform of the economies of these countries cannot 
proceed primarily on a macroeconomic level. This realization, given the recent 
reform efforts in a number of East European countries, is of great
importance. 26
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For example, the case of Poland is quite instructive. The first stage of 
the economic reform there, known as the “Balcorewicz Plan”, consisted of a 
series of macroeconomic measures -  such as credit restrictions, wage 
restraints, and reduction of subsidies -  designed to arrest inflationary 
pressures in the economy. The effects of this series of moves were in part 
quite predictable: prices at first shot upwards, then inflation slowed down quite 
dramatically and prices remained relatively stable. Among other expected 
effects was a fall in production and rise in unemployment. Both of these did 
indeed happen, though to an extent differently from what had been expected 
and perhaps for reasons that had not been foreseen.
The authors of the Balcerowics Plan also expected, however, that the 
macroeconomic measures undertaken would result not only in the elimination 
of the inflationary pressures but also the creation of the basic conditions of a 
market economy. It was expected that the lifting of subsidies, together with 
other monetary measures, would result in a readjustment of prices. By 
bringing out a more realistic assessment of costs and revenues of each 
particular enterprise, this in turn was supposed to provide proper incentives 
for the management and put state enterprises on a sound footing. 
Privatization would merely complete the process begun by the macro 
economic reform. When the real viability of individual enterprises was going to 
be determined by the market, the enterprises could then be valued and 
gradually sold off through a variety of well known techniques.
26 Gregory S. Alexander, A Fourth Wav, p. 129
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The only way of correcting the inefficiency of post socialist state 
enterprises is to move as fast as possible toward a real property regime. An 
immediate move, of a limited scope but considerable practical importance, is 
to introduce a new legal system of state property. This process of 
corporazation would consist of an immediate transformation of state 
enterprises into joint-stock companies. But nothing will remove the need for 
speedy privatization. Privatization should not be seen as just the last stage in 
the process of transition from a centrally planned economy to capitalism. At 
the same time, it is an indispensable condition of an efficient control of 
management performance
There are four main premises that helped the success of East 
European privatization.
(i) Privatization must be accomplished quickly. If privatization is the 
core of the process in which the state enterprises become 
restructured, the economic reform in Eastern Europe cannot 
proceed without a radical ownership transformation.
(ii) Privatization must be socially acceptable. The East European 
industry, antiquated and inefficient as it is, has been built at the 
price of enormous sacrifices by the general population over the 
last fifty years. The rise in standards of living was constantly 
retarded by the policy of investment in heavy industrial 
infrastructure. Because of the sale of this industry at very low
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prices, the public opinion could turn against the privatization 
program.
(iii) The people of Eastern Europe also have a somewhat 
ambivalent attitude toward privatization and market economy as 
a whole. On the one hand, nearly everyone understands that the 
move in the direction of capitalism is necessary and can be 
expected to yield, in the long run, significant improvements in 
standards of living.^^ But on the other hand, the move toward a 
market economy means further sacrifices, involving potentially 
high rates of unemployment with which the people of Eastern 
Europe are not familiar.
(iv) Privatization must assure effective control over the management 
of privatized enterprises. The move away from bureaucratic 
control over the economy cannot mean a simple removal of all 
control mechanisms with respect to the functioning of the 
enterprises. In other words, when the control mechanisms of the 
command economy are eliminated, something else must be put 
in their place that will play the same role, like the institutions of a 
Western market economy. Prime among these institutions is a 
system that provides incentives for managers of enterprises to 
maximize the interests of the shareholders which correspond to 
the interests of the consumers. In the capitalist societies, this 
task is accomplished, through a variety of institutions, such as 
takeover mechanisms, markets for managerial ability or an
' ' '  Roman Fiydman, op.cil.,p. 14
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elaborate banking system that supervises company 
management. Without these institutions, this would undermine 
the whole meaning of privatization, which I believe is “not a 
simple change of ownership, but also a radical restructuring that 
transforms the incentive system of the economic agents at the 
enterprise level.
Privatization assures access to foreign capital and expertise. Eastern 
European countries need Western funds, know-how and management 
expertise. In order to be effective, the entry of foreign capital and expertise 
cannot take place through a provision of advisory and consulting services. 
The only way, in which financial institutions can play a creative role in the 
region, is to have their entry based on sound business principles, so they 
stand to gain or lose by their activities. This means that privatization policies 
create conditions that make entry attractive from a business point of view.
In general, there are three methods of privatization which have been 
applied to Eastern Europe. First, I will try to analyze these methods and than 
I’ll give some examples about cases from some different countries. The first 
type modeled after the United Kingdom, aims at the creation of viable stock 
markets and a system of external financing of corporate investment; it is 
believed that the resulting market for corporate control would have the desired 
disciplinary effect on the behavior of company managers. The second type, 
inspired by the German system, advocates a so-called internal market, that is 
a system in which banks and other financial institutions play a crucial role in
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supervising corporate management and the financing of corporate investment. 
Finally, the third type is spontaneous privatization, to be initiated by the 
present management with the support of the workers. This type of proposal 
favors the preservation, indeed strengthening, of the present control
structure. 28
The East Europeans often view the stock markets as the ultimate 
symbol of capitalist maturity. For this reason, as well as because of the 
inherently non-bureaucratic modus operand! of the market, many East 
Europeans see stock markets as attractive devices for exercising a measure 
of external control over corporate management. Creation of a measure of 
external control over corporate management can be attempted in a number of 
ways. One can try to sell state enterprises to foreign and domestic investors, 
hoping that each firm will end up with at least one significant large owner who 
will take an active interest in the way it is run. Another extreme is a naked 
giveaway plan:^ ® The population at large might receive special vouchers that 
each holder can exchange for the shares of a corporation of his or her choice. 
Through later trades, a market for the shares of the privatized companies is 
expected to develop and, because of the possibility of takeovers create some 
pressures on company management to improve performance
In brief, the sales model of privatization appears both economically and 
politically unfeasible. If the prospective buyers are to be domestic, there is 
enough capital available internally in Eastern Europe to make the sale of most
28
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State enterprises a realistic possibility. If foreign investors are to be relied 
upon, because of the uncertainty concerning the stability of the region and the 
high cost of monitoring foreign investments, it is likely to induce the 
prospective buyers to impose politically unacceptable high discount on the 
price of East European corporations^° Insofar as the giveaway plans are 
concerned, they would lead, at least initially to an extreme fragmentation of 
ownership, with the concomitant inability of the investors to exercise any 
meaningful control over management.
To explain the privatization programs about the control of management 
by financial institutions more easily, we have to analyze one special version of 
this type, which was adopted by the Polish Government for its so-called mass 
privatization program involving the largest 500 state enterprises in Poland.
The 500 largest enterprises were first converted into a joint-stock 
company. Then the 500 enterprises were disposed of in several phases, with 
150-200 privatized in the first phase. An appropriate number of vouchers were 
issued for each phase, with two-thirds most likely going to the public at large 
(each citizen receiving one voucher) and one-third to the social security office 
(to capitalize the state pension fund) Thus the citizens received vouchers 
equivalent to 40% of the value of the privatized enterprises, and the state
pension fund 20% 31
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The State then invited the creation of a number of intermediary 
institutions (investment and restructuring funds), which offered their shares in 
exchange for vouchers. (The entry was to be free, so that any person or 
institution, foreign, domestic, or mixed, would be able to create an 
intermediary, as long as the minimum conditions specified in a special law 
were satisfied) The vouchers received by the citizens were to be used to 
purchase the shares of the intermediaries, with each person having a choice 
among the intermediary institutions in which they wanted to invest. The social 
security system had a choice of depositing all or some of its vouchers with 
intermediaries or of creating one or more special pension funds of its own.
Once the vouchers were transferred to the intermediaries, the 150-200 
companies privatized in the first phase were to be sold at a specially designed 
auction. The state also deposited 30% of the shares it owned in the 
intermediaries according to some predetermined formula. However, the state 
was not to become an ordinary shareholder of the intermediary institutions; its 
shares were to be apportioned to the intermediaries, and the state’s role in 
them was to be limited to appointing of one director on the board of each 
intermediary. The intermediaries were to be charged with selling the state’s 
shares in each privatized company to other investors, either on private 
placement or in the open market.
When the transfer of ownership and control was to be completed, new 
directors were to be appointed by the intermediaries and other shareholders 
for each company, and the business of restructuring would thus begin. The
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new owners would be free to change the management of the privatized 
companies, to split them up, to sell a part of their holdings, to approve various 
joint-venture arrangements between the privatized companies and other 
entities. The sale by the intermediaries of the 30% of the shares held by them 
on behalf of the state would allow for an introduction of core investors into a 
number of the privatized companies, as well as to create a market for a 
sizeable proportion of the shares of the privatized companies. This experience 
constitutes the method of privatization to realize corporate control through 
financial institutions.
The third method is spontaneous privatization. The idea of 
spontaneous privatization looks like an East European equivalent of a 
management buy-out. The pressure for this type of ownership change comes 
instead from an alliance between the workers and the management who are 
intent on resisting significant departures from the status quo: it is precisely the 
opposition to a restructuring that is likely to result from genuine privatization 
that motivates the alliance. In addition, in the Polish context at least, the 
change is unlikely to lead to increased efficiency; quite the contrary, one of 
the primary incentives towards spontaneous privatization is an attempt by the 
workers to get around the stiff tax on wage increases that applies to the 
employees of state enterprises, but which maybe relaxed for companies that 
privatize. So, the pressure for spontaneous privatization is primarily political, 
and as such it may turn out to be a threat to genuine restructuring.
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Privatization refers to the process of transferring ownership rights of 
productive assets held by the state. Although in the contemporary East 
European context such a transfer is usually seen as the principal means of 
creating a private sector in an economy dominated by the public sector, the 
two processes (privatization and the creation of private sector) should not be 
confused. First, transferring ownership from state to private hands is unlikely 
to be sufficient to create a dynamic private market economy. Second, a 
private sector might be produced more effectively by measures to stimulate 
the start-up of new ventures and expansion of existing units in the nascent 
private sector than by transforming state assets into private assets.^^ Anyway, 
each government in the region looks to privatization, that is, ownership 
transfer, as the fundamental step toward the creation of a market economy. 
Now I will try to focus on the variation in privatization strategies across the 
three cases. How do East European governments differ in their policies for 
transferring ownership of the assets of state enterprises? For a typology to 
portray these differences, three central questions to define three dimensions 
must be addressed by any program of privatization.
1. How are the state’s assets evaluated?
2. Who can acquire these assets?
3. With what resources are ownership rights acquired?
The Czech strategy evaluates assets directly by the market, involves 
participation on the basis of citizenship, and uses monetary resources. The
Leo Hunvicz, “The Mechanisms o f Resource Allocations”, Journal o f Asian Economics 14:(1991), 
p.55
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program that the Czech economic authorities are launching involves the 
distribution of over 50 percent of the equity in more than 1,500 large public 
enterprises through a citizenship voucher scheme. Each Czech citizen over 
18 years of age receives vouchers equal to 1,000 investment points. These 
investment points can be exchanged for shares in the enterprises designated 
for privatization through the voucher program. But although every citizen 
receives these vouchers as a matter of right, only those who pay a registration 
fee of 1,000 Korunas will be able to use the vouchers in the public auctions. 
To indicate that the equity shares obtained through the voucher program are 
not a free gift from the state, to signal that there will be risk involved, and to 
filter out citizens with no serious interest in ownership, Czech officials have 
designed a voucher scheme that combines citizenship participation and
monetary resources 33
The first stage of the voucher-auction program began in 1992. Because 
of the complexity of the actual process of exchanging vouchers for shares 
Czech authorities undertook a major program to educate the public about its 
principles.
It is possible to summarize the major principles of the Czech strategy of 
privatization in three categories. First and most importantly, the Czech 
leadership appears committed to using a stimulated market to rapidly achieve 
a functioning equity market in the shares of a significant proportion of former 
state enterprises.
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Second, with a capital market organized around the stock exchange 
stimulated by the voucher-action program, the Czechoslovak economy 
appears to be heading in the direction of raising investments funds through 
markets typical of the Anglo-American system rather than through the 
Japanese-German system. The banks play a more central role in monitoring 
and directing the performance of their creditor firms in that. Third, the 
Czechoslovak leadership appears to be prepared to accept relatively 
dispersed ownership in the initial stage of its privatization program in the hope 
that later transactions in the actual capital market will yield relatively rapid 
concentration of ownership in the midlevel enterprises.
The story of Poland’s privatization strategy begins in Gdansk, the 
birthplace of the largest independent trade union in Eastern Europe. Gdansk 
was also the birthplace of Polish neoliberalism. After the liberalism, property 
reform was on the agenda. The Mazowiecki government announced a 
program of clean privatization, using the British models as its centerpiece with 
the promise of foreign investors and large public of fer ings.But foreign 
investors were slow and few. They were looking more to Hungary and former 
East Germany. And also, the public offerings made little dent in the state- 
owned assets of the large socialist enterprises.
After the election campaign in which first name was Walesa promised 
an increase of in the speed of privatization, he asked to elaborate and specify
34"Andrcja Bohin, Privati/iition in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 378
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the sweeping program for mass privatization. They faced the enormous 
problem of the fact that domestic savings could cover only a fraction of the 
assets of the large state enterprises. On this subject Lewadonski the new 
minister of property transformation had said that “privatization is when 
someone who does not know who the real owner is and does not know what it 
is really worth sells something to someone who does not have any money” ®^
The program of mass privatization was formally announced in 1991. 
Calls for the property transformation of some 400 Polish enterprises occurred 
in the first stage of its operation. Employees in the privatized firms received a 
free 10 percent of the shares of their companies.
At the center of the mass privatization program, however, stands a 
universal citizens grant in the form of share vouchers issued to every Polish 
citizen. In marked contrast to the Czechoslovak program, no registration fee is 
required to participate. A problem lies in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into 
two independent countries. The significant cross-border investment activity in 
the first wave, especially Slovak investments into Czech companies, suggests 
that the two countries will continue to maintain close economic relations.
In another variation from the Czechoslovak schemes, Polish citizens do 
not have to exchange their vouchers directly for shares in a privatized 
enterprise. Thus, in contrast of the Czechoslovak imitation of Anglo-American 
practices, the Poles looked to the models in Germany and Japan. But in
3.5 Vedat Milor, op.cit, p. 43
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general, with its unrestricted access to shares, the Polish voucher program is 
more inclusive than the Czechoslovak project.
Our third example of Hungary was characterized by the combination of 
bargained evaluation of assets, corporate owners, and positional resources.^® 
Although Hungary’s centralized State Property Agency (SPA) has a strong 
legislative mandate to supervise and control all aspects of the privatization 
process; asset evaluation in Hungary is not conducted through administrative 
means, as in Germany.
When the SPA nominated a list of 20 enterprises to be sold in the first 
round of privatization, the agency also announced an open invitation to 
investment banks and consulting firms to place proposals with the agency 
indicating, in general terms, how they would evaluate assets, arrange credit, 
and find a buyer for a given enterprise. That is, the agency put up for tender 
the rights to manage the restructuring of a particular company. Actually, the 
SPA was not directly selling enterprises but instead was selling the rights to 
lead and manage their privatization.
Basically, Hungarian privatization was a spontaneous process in which 
the managers actually gained control. In Hungary when the government sold 
SOEs, people accused government officials of selling them too cheaply. Then, 
when they raised prices, no buyers appeared with the result that privatization
36 Aiidreja Böhm, op.cit. p.l80
41
has taken much longer. But it must be indicated that, this country in the region 
has had the greatest performance of foreign investment. Also, Hungary is a 
very good example because, the early and successful privatizations of crown 
jewels such as telecom company MATAV, oil and gas company MOL, 
pharmaceutical producer Gedeon Richter and bank OTP are seen as 
benchmark transactions for the region. Openness to outside investment has 
brought a virtuous circle to the market leaders; further inflows of direct and 
portfolio investment and improvements in corporate governance and 
competitiveness.
Although there were many problems, the most ambitious privatization 
programs, however, have been the ones undertaken in the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. In these economies, all 
enterprises were state-owned in 1990, but by the mid 1990’s several transition 
economies had privatized majority of them. For example, 90% of Czech 
enterprises passed to private hands in the period 1990-96.
As we see in East European Countries, selling state enterprises is to 
improve company efficiency and performance. Nevertheless, those managing 
the process have additional political goals and sensitivities that can 
complicate the decision to sell. In this sense, we see again that privatization is 
always political. That is why the most important lesson is that for privatization 
to succeed politically, it must re-enfranchise a great many people as owners. 
This involves more than just giving away assets. After privatization, corporate 
governance institutions must be established that are perceived to protect
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minority interests, protect individual investors and furnish needed information. 
Thus the privatization process and post-privatization environment would be 
accepted as transparent and fair. Such acceptance is the only hope for 
generating large-scale political support for privatization. According to that, in 
countries where there was no mass privatization, the sale of state assets 
could not generate political support because few people benefited from it. On 
that point, the Eastern European countries succeeded politically and became 
a successful case for other developing countries.
In respect to the transitional economies, privatization needs to be 
understood in even broader terms than just turning the state owned 
enterprises over to the private sector. It must mean privatizing the economy, 
by which the role of the economy is reduced from that of owner to that of a 
regulator for its guidance and assistance role.
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3.Privatization in the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is widely considered as the star of the transition 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Its economic reforms are well 
advanced and its market economy is flourishing. The citizens of the Czech 
Republic are more strongly in favour of liberal market reforms and 
privatization off state owned enterprises than in any country in the region.
When analyzing the overall Czech reform package of 1991, one is 
struck by the pivotal importance attached to privatization, and to the originality 
of the voucher privatization programme. To understand the weight placed on 
privatization, it is important to bear in mind the initial economic and political 
setting. Czechoslovakia was a country that had suffered the overpowering 
influence of party bureaucracy and was deficient in individuals with 
experience in entrepreneurial activities.Fast privatization was advocated for 
political and economic reasons. It stemmed both from the failed experience of 
attempted mild reforms within the old system and from the desire to remove 
all traces of socialism, such as state ownership.
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The Czech Government believed that the absence of effective 
ownership rights was at the heart of the old system’s inefficiencies. From the 
beginning, the consensus in the country was that privatization was necessary. 
The initial problem was formulating objectives and deciding how to proceed. 
Early theoretical discussion in the West tended to stress provision of 
incentives for better resource allocation, the fiscal benefits from revenues of 
sales, and monetary considerations about the absorption of the monetary 
projection. Lessons from privatization in Western Europe appeared limited. 
Privatization there was on a smaller scale and primarily involved the utilities. It 
usually took the form of block sale or public offering by capital markets. Such 
methods were not the obvious way to proceed in the Czech case.
Another important obstacle was, valuation of enterprises, which 
depends on judgements about the future profitability. The enterprises to be 
privatized did not have a market track record on which to base valuation and 
there were no expert financial institutions to underwrite the process. Imperfect 
information about policy regarding prices, taxation, credit and the treatment of 
outstanding debts aggravated the difficulty in formulating predictions of future 
profitability.
The Czech Government decided that the state must primarily distribute 
its holdings in the enterprise sector to the population at large for free. Beside 
that, the Czech Government wanted to ensure that privatization would 
improve management, the pricing mechanism, the structure of industry and
37 o._.Saul Estrin, Privatiaition In Central & Eastern Europe, p. 155
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the allocation of capital. Liquidation of companies and questions of long-term 
viability were therefore intervened with changes in ownership and the 
clarification of ownership rights.
First, corporate governance had to be created to ensure that managers 
adjust their behaviour from reliance on orders from planners to those from 
shareholders. Principal-agent theory suggests that in the private sector 
contractual discipline is enforced by potential bidders and by the bankruptcy 
discipline enforced by creditors. Second, pressures on management were to 
be made effective by enterprise restructuring and the introduction of market 
competition through free trade and anti-monopoly legislation. Ownership 
reform was not intended to deal with the adjustment process by itself. It was 
to do so hand in hand with new bankruptcy and competition laws and within 
the restructuring of the banking and foreign trade systems.^®
A series of reforms was introduced in the Czech Republic from the 
beginning of 1991. Measures directed at the enterprise sector have included 
price liberalization, the drafting of bankruptcy legislation, and the start of small 
scale privatization and large scale privatization. The programme also stressed 
a comprehensive liberalisation of foreign trade and convertibility of the 
currency.
The weakness of State Owned Enterprises adjustment rapidly 
manifested itself in the wake of transition. The drop of output was greater than
38 Saul Estrin. op.cit., p.l58
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expected; GDP declined by 16 per cent in 1991 as opposed to the 5 per cent 
forecast. Industrial output fell even further but employment rather less. This 
drop in output has been mainly attributed to a fall in demand (domestic and 
foreign), with the inflexible response of the state-owned sector to changing 
demand conditions as a contributory factor.
The Czech Republic implemented a two track policy, comprising both 
“small-scale” privatization and ’’large scale” privatization. Small-scale 
privatization consists of the auction of shops and service establishments to 
individuals, mainly implemented at a local level. It envisages transfer to Czech 
citizens in the first instance and, only failing that, acquisition by foreigners. It is 
aimed at manufacturing, banking, and insurance organizations which often 
have a domestic monopolistic character and invariably operate on a large 
scale. It involves a voucher scheme to put large state enterprises into the 
hands of private owners. Former Czechoslovakia is thus moving towards 
allowing individual share ownership in most large medium-size firms both 
directly and through mutual funds. Privatization has also been the main way to 
ensure enterprise restructuring. The voucher scheme is intended to ensure 
the rapid transfer of state-owned property to the private sector and to offer 
Czech citizens a stake in the reforms.
As a result of the reform program, about 80 percent of the Czech 
industry, which account for about 70 percent of economic output, are 
regarded as privatized at the moment. In other sectors this share is even 
higher: in the construction sector about 90 percent, in the service sector
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almost 100 percent. In view of the fact that a huge number of these 
companies are controlled by investments funds and these, in turn, are 
controlled by the big banks the majority of which are still state-owned.
Prior to 1989, there were few private enterprises in Czechoslovakia. 
State and cooperative property were the only ownership forms recognized by 
the constitution. Nationalization in the late 1940s and early 1950s had left less 
room for private enterprise than in Hungry, Poland or the former German 
Democratic Republic. The “Velvet Revolution” of November 1989 brought a 
democratic government to power and President “Havel to the Castle”, chanted 
the millions of demonstrators filling the streets of Prague. The Velvet 
Revolution gave the signal for far-reaching changes, both political and 
economic.
The separation of Czechoslovakia into two independent states, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, on 1 January 1993, had a traumatic effect on a 
large sections of the population in both parts of the country, as well as a 
negative impact on economic growth. At the time it occurred, however, the 
separation could no longer hold back the sweeping wave of economic reform, 
particularly on the Czech side of the new border.
A very important approach to speeding privatization is simultaneous 
transfer to private owners of a large number of state-owned enterprises. 
Because most of the local population does not have the financial resources to 
buy shares on their own, the concept -  for which the term “mass privatization”
48
has been coined -  normally also embraces free distribution of ownership 
rights to citizens in the form of vouchers that are used to “purchase” shares in 
the enterprises. In addition to speed, this process has a political dimension, 
for it creates widespread private ownership at little or no cost to the voucher 
holders. It is also controversial.
On the plus side, the vouchers provide an otherwise nonliquid 
population to the liquidity to purchase property. Mass privatization has been 
touted as being one of the most equitable routes to privatization, because 
citizens receive equal ownership stakes. It also avoids the problem of trying to 
establish a share price for hundreds of individual enterprises during the early 
stages of economic transition-ownership rights are transferred before serious 
appraisal or valuation. Finally, the speed of the process limits the possibilities 
for unregulated spontaneous privatizations and prevents the possible 
deterioration of assets when the privatization program drags on over a long 
period of time.
Also, they avoid problems of absorptive capacity and purchasing power 
by rapidly giving at least some ownership in a firm or firms to a population that 
can not-or would not- purchase it. They are equitable, since under the 
proposed schemes all or most of the population receives shares at no cost or 
is given the chance to obtain shares at low cost.''°
'‘Accelerating Privatization in E.\-Socialist Economies”, Global Issues In Transition. March 1994, 
p.47
Sunita Kikeri, The Lessons o f Experience, p.78
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The self employment rate -measured against the number of companies 
in relation to the working population- has in the meantime not only reached 
the average EU value of 12 percent but has even slightly surpassed it. In 
1997, the Czech Statistical Office listed about 1,400,000 entrepreneurs. The 
great majority of economic entities falls into the category of small and ultra 
small business.
The Czech privatization Ministry was disbanded as of 1996. In the six 
years of its existence the ministry had, within the overall framework of the 
“small privatization”, auctioned off 22,000 companies, liquidated 2,000 state- 
owned companies, transferred ownership of 800 properties to municipalities, 
processed 70,000 applications for restitution and paid compensations to 2,500 
co-operatives. During the “large privatizations” assets to the value of one 
billion Czech crowns werd de-nationalised and 304 billion distributed among 
the population by means of vouchers. The assets still owned by the state 
mainly consist of 52 so-called strategic companies and stakes in about 1,400 
companies which are managed by the National Property Fund. The latter is to 
be sold off by means direct sales within the coming years.
While privatization in the small and medium sized business is almost 
complete according to government statistics, with approximately 80% of all 
companies privatized, the more difficult large industrial privatization has yet to 
be implemented on the same scale.
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Privatization could not solve the basic problems of the companies. The 
target to restructure companies and to fortify them with market economic 
structures for competition in a free market has largely been missed. 
Exceptions occurred when a (in most cases foreign) investor bought a stake 
in a company or took over the whole company or holds a majority of its 
shares, like for instance VW at Skoda, and made new investments. One 
reason among others the restructuring process is proceeding at such a 
sluggish speed is the newly created ownership structure. The companies 
have basically received three groups of new owners. The first group consists 
of about 2 million shareholders who have bought only few shares. The 
dominating role is played by the investment funds. According to estimates, the 
ten biggest investment funds manage two thirds of the fund business. The 
field between the small shareholders and the big funds occupied by 300 
medium-sized and small' investment funds which mainly concentrate their 
activities on the trading of shares. The small shareholders as owners are too 
weak and often not qualified enough to push restructuring programmes 
through. In addition they also lack capital. The big investment funds shun 
restructuring measures because of their conflicting interests. For the same big 
banks which are wholly or partly owned by the state and dominate lending 
business are, via subsidiaries, some of the most important operators in the 
investment funds. They can hardly be interested in a wave of restructuring 
which would tidy up the situation for the companies, but would on the other 
hand create considerable losses for creditors. The government also has to 
take part of the blame for the sluggish speed of the restructuring process, as a
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big part of the shares in many companies are still, via the National Property 
Fund, held by the state.
The restructuring that never took place is now to be achieved in the 
“third privatization” hoped for the sale of the companies by their current 
owners to new investors. First steps in this direction seem to emerge 
presently. By the end of 1995, two-thirds of the shareholders had sold their 
shares, mostly to investment funds. The investment fund are not allowed to 
hold more than 20 percent of the shares in any single company, a fact which 
is not really conductive to facilitating decisions on the supervisory boards. As 
a consequence, some funds have started to turn themselves into 
shareholding companies. The investment made by shareholding companies 
are not restricted by the 20 percent rule, in return, however, they are subject 
to stricter legal regulations. The role of the new “holding companies” as active 
investors becomes particularly obvious by the fact that they try to fill the key 
position in the management of the companies in order to be able to influence 
the important decisions of company policy. The consequences is redistribution 
of ownership
Mass privatization in the former socialist countries could take several 
forms: simply turning ownership to the current managers and workers; making 
all or some enterprises into joint stock companies and distributing a 
percentage of shares to the current managers and workers; creating mutual 
funds, distributing shares to the public; distributing to the public vouchers or
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coupons that entitle them to bid directly on shares in individual firms; and 
several variations in between.
Mass privatization is a process in which a substantial part of the 
economy’s public assets is quickly transferred to a large, diverse group of 
private buyers. It involves bundling or grouping firms to be privatized, as 
opposed to the ’’classical" or case-by-case approach taken in the OECD 
countries and widely emulated in many developing countries in Latin America, 
Asia and in Hungary.
Mass privatization usually involves the distribution of shares of state 
enterprises to the public, either for free or for a minimal charge, generally 
through a voucher allocation scheme. Vouchers normally take the form of 
certificates or scripts distributed to the population and are convertible into 
shares in State enterprises through an auction process. Although mass 
privatization schemes and vouchers are not inevitably linked, they are 
generally associated with each other. In at least ten Eastern European 
countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States, vouchers are being 
used to speed the privatization process and to ensure a more equitable 
distribution of the wealth previously held by the state.
Allocating vouchers is just one of a number of measures used to 
privatize firms quickly. Other measures, such as deep discounts (including low 
floor prices for auctions), liberal arrangements for management and employee 
buyouts, transfers to entrepreneurs at book value, management contracts.
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leases, and contracting out, are also used. Nevertheless, vouchers play an 
integral role in the mass privatization programs.'’^
The basic principle of the voucher method is as follows: state 
enterprises are transferred into the ownership of private citizens not for money 
but in exchange for investment vouchers. Every citizen over the age of 18 can 
buy investment vouchers, in the form of a voucher booklet, containing 1,000 
investment points, a form of “investment money”, for a registration fee of 
Kc. 1,000 (US$35-originally one quarter of the average monthly wage). These 
vouchers entitle all citizens to bid for ownership of shares in any company 
included in the voucher privatization scheme, or to entrust their investment 
points to an investment fund, making investment decisions centrally and 
holding a diversified portfolio.'’^
The primary objective of mass privatization programs is to create the base 
for a market economy by privatizing state enterprises as quickly as possible. 
Given the initial conditions in most formerly socialist countries, such as limited 
private capital formation, a lack of interest or confidence from foreign 
investors, political limits on the sale of state enterprises to foreigners, and the 
need to involve citizens in the economic transformation process through 
widely distributed ownership, policymakers in many of these countries have 
decided to initiate mass privatization programs. The overall objectives of such
programs are: 43
Robert Andersen, Privatization and restnicturing in Central and eastern Europe, p.3 
Rolph Van der Hoeven, Lessons From Privatization, p. 15
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•  Political: attempting to involve and commit the population at large to the 
economic transformation process.
•  Social: seeking some form of distributive equity through the distribution of 
shares to the general public.
• Economic: quickly privatizing a large number of firms to deepen market 
forces and competition within the economy.
Some former Soviet Bloc countries have moved slowly toward democracy and 
capitalism -  while others abandoned reform parties for resurgent neo­
communist ones. However, for a number of reasons the Czech Republic has 
made a swift transition to a free market economy with a minimum of trauma 
and has the most stable government in the region.
The result of market reforms is evident in the Czech Republic:
Gross domestic product grew by 4.5 percent in 1995 and is currently 
growing at 6 percent a year.
Industrial production has been rising at a rate of more than 9 percent 
for two years in a row.
>4' Per capita income already equals that of Portugal, a member of the 
European Community, and inflation is less than 10 percent a year.
Andrcjii Rolnn Privalization in Central and Eastern Europe, p .l52
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Unemployment is the lowest of all European countries at 3.5 percent.
The government budget is running a surplus and foreign capital is 
flowing into the country.
Among the factors that account for Czechs successful reforms since its first 
non-communist government came to power in November 1989 are:
The region was heavily industrialised for generations before the 
post-war Communist take-over.
It is a Western European country in every sense political, economic 
and cultural.
Reformers, led by the non-Marxist economist Vaclav Klaus, 
planned carefully for a year and acted decisively beginning in 
January 1991, including decontrolling prices and making the 
currency convertible
Mass privatization of 2,500 state enterprises through vouchers has 
moved the economy from 2 percent private ownership in 1990 to 80 
percent today.
Industrial production fell by 35 percent during the privatization process, 
as inefficient state enterprises were liquidated. However, Klaus prepared the
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public in advance by repeatedly explaining the necessity and benefits of 
reform.^^
All fundamental structural changes forming part of economic 
transformation in the Czech Republic were completed in 1995. Whereas in 
1989, when 98% of all property was owned or directly controlled by the state, 
the major part of all economic activity occurred in the private sector in 1995, 
when about 70% of gross domestic product was created by the non-state 
sector. Whereas in 1989, approximately 90% of all prices were regulated by 
the state authorities, in 1995 the state only regulated rental payments for 
apartments and most energy prices (electricity, gas, coal, etc.). Whereas in 
1989, all wages were under direct state control, in 1995 the government 
abolished all regulatory measures in this field. Before 1995, a certain amount 
of wage control still existed in order to prevent inflationary pressure.
Privatization by the voucher method has allowed millions of Czech 
citizens to become small shareholders, and also gave rise to several 
investment privatization funds. This laid the foundations for very fast 
development of the domestic capital market. In turn, the existence of the 
capital market was the necessary prerequisite for the process of concentrating 
capital in the hands of strong, active investors. Such a process must take 
place in the Czech Republic because it is the only way of creating an 
ownership structure similar to those found in all advanced countries. The 
introduction of free convertibility of the Czech crown in 1995, by the passage
”  Roger W.Fontaine, Red Phoenix Rising? Dealing WitJi the Communist Resurgence in Eastern 
Europe, p.2
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of an amended Foreign Exchange Act, can be regarded as the culmination of 
the transformation process.
The economic results of 1995 also confirm that progress is being made 
in economic reform. In the first years of the transformation process, a major 
decline in production took place, manifesting itself in falling gross domestic 
product and national income. However, an upturn in the main indicators of 
economic growth was observed in 1995. The national income rose by 4.1% in 
1995.
Other indicators also signify macroeconomic stability. Overall inflation 
was around 9,5% in the mid 1990’s, unemployment did not exceed 3.1%. Also 
the state budget showed a moderate surplus and the size of the state’s 
internal and foreign debt declined. Foreign-exchange reserves increased to 
such a level that it became possible to declare the national currency freely 
convertible. So far, this step has had no effect on the long-term stability of the 
exchange rates of the Czech crown. However, the non-production sphere still 
mainly accounted for the creation of reserves because the balance of trade 
remained in deficit.
The second and probably the last wave of voucher privatization was 
completed in 1994. Using this form of privatization, about 60% of all property 
and shares earmarked for privatization as part of large scale-scale project 
privatization were realized.
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On the one hand, it is possible to say that the mass privatization 
process was concluded, but on the other hand, a large volume of shares and 
property remain to be privatized. There are several reasons why the 
remaining property cannot be privatized by the voucher method. The most 
important is the need to obtain, through the privatization of the residual state 
property and shares, the necessary funds for dealing with the most pressing 
problems inherited from the communist period (financial compensation under 
restitution laws, support of institutions set up for resolving the problem of 
doubtful receivables, expenses for redressing old environmental damage, 
funds for the construction of the Ingolstadt oil pipeline, etc.)
In contrast to the preceding years, when the main privatization strategy 
was to make the privatization process as speedy as possible, much greater 
attention was given in 1995 to the amount of funds obtained through 
privatization. Thus the basic strategy has become not only to privatize at a 
fast rate-the new requirement is to privatize not only speedily but also in the 
most effective way.
The methods employed today are keeping with this strategy. 
Privatization in the Czech Republic can be described as mass utilization of 
standard privatization methods. For example public auctions, tenders, direct 
sales and sales of shares through the capital market.
The Czech Republic’s leaders recognized the need for speed and 
impracticality of privatizing thousands of enterprises by traditional methods
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within a short time. Their solution was voucher privatization, with restructuring 
to follow post-privatization. To accommodate differing views of how 
privatization should proceed, however, their decision was modified to allow 
firm managements -  or anybody else- to propose their own plans for 
privatization. The ensuing deluge of proposals, many of poor quality, 
swamped the Ministry of Privatization, and the result was that the first round 
of voucher privatization was delayed by almost two years. Vitally-needed 
restructuring of firms in crisis could not wait that long."*®
As stated above, mass privatization involves giving away ownership of 
state-owned firms to all citizens. The Czech republic pioneered this method in 
1991 and privatized more than 1500 firms by 1994. In some cases, a portion 
of a firm’s shares were reserved for sale using conventional methods. A 
citizen was given (for a nominal charge) a coupon which could be used to buy 
shares in a national auction in any firm included in the program.
Citizens could bid in any of the firms included in the program. 
Alternatively, they could decide to turn over their coupons to an investment 
fund and thus become part owner of a much larger and diversified portfolio. 
Almost anyone could establish a fund with minimal regulation. About 70% of 
the coupons were turned over to 550 funds that became the dominant owners 
of Czech firms.
Andreja Bohm, op.cit.p.l48  
Robert E. Anderson, op.cit.p. 13
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Mass privatization has brought into existence 1,680 joint-stock 
companies which replaced the original state enterprises and the transfer of 
shares with a total nominal value of 363.000 million crowns from the hands of 
the state into the hand of small shareholders, individual citizens and several 
investments privatization funds.
The Czech program is top-down and a bottom-up approach. It is top- 
down, because the privatization law requires that all large firms be privatized. 
It is bottom-up, because state enterprises or bidders prepare their own 
privatization plans, which are reviewed by the relevant ministry and by the 
ministries of privatization
After 1995, the results of mass privatization began to appear in day-to- 
day life. New shareholders appeared on boards of directors and the 
supervisory boards of privatized companies-representatives of privatization 
investment privatization who have now begun to exert pressure on the 
management of companies. The other shareholders, such as individual 
participants in voucher privatization who invested directly in privatized 
companies are beginning to realize that they have practically no chance of 
influencing company affairs.
It is possible to regard the most important result of mass privatization 
as the coming into existence of a large number of new economic entities, 
independent of the state, and of an enormous number of shareholders, and 
the related development of the capital market. The voucher privatization
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process also had a not insubstantial educational effect, because it showed 
millions of people what it means to be a shareholder, what transactions can 
be carried out with shares, when dividends can be paid out and acquainted 
them with a number of useful facts necessary for correct orientation in the 
market economy.
Those who expected that the new shareholders would immediately 
begin to perform their functions as owners were probably disappointed. 
Investment privatization funds and all the other shareholders whose existence 
originated in the voucher privatization understandably behaved, in most 
cases, as passive investors. As a rule, they were mainly interested in selling 
their shares as profitably as possible, and in obtaining money by transactions 
on the capital market. Such shareholders participated to a relatively small 
extent in the creation of active business concepts of companies.
After the end of voucher privatization, the national Property Fund 
owned financial interests of varying sizes in more than 1200 joint-stock 
companies (besides strategic interests companies). Mostly, they were the 
shares that remained unsold after voucher privatization (the voucher 
privatization technology used in the Czech Republic did not make it possible 
in practice to sell all the shares that were offered). However, the National 
Property Fund was also left holding some shares for other reasons (e.g. 
prospective purchasers approved by the government lost interest in acquiring 
shares, negotiations with potential foreign investors were not concluded, joint 
stock companies did not purchase all the staff shares which they had
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originally requested, etc.) In this connection, it is necessary to point out that 
the National Property Fund’s interests in the various companies differs 
greatly, and ranges from fractions of one per cent to majority interests.
In this category the main privatization strategy is to privatize at a fast 
rate and to maximize yields. An overwhelming majority of these shares is 
therefore being sold through the capital market or by tender. Priority is being 
given to the privatization of majority and large interests because the National 
Property Fund is determined to quickly divest itself of responsibility for 
important business decisions which must be taken by the actual long-term 
owner or controlling shareholder.
In selling shares on the capital market (in particular on the Prague 
Stock Exchange), the National Property Fund is using the method of “block 
sales”, which means that it offers for sale blocks of shares, usually 
representing a certain percentage of shares in specific companies. This sales 
technique is based on the Dutch auction principle, whereby a seller gradually 
reduces the original absurdly high asking price of the block of shares offered. 
The deal is made when, on the demand side, three is a party ready to accept 
the price at which the whole block of shares is offered. By means of this 
technique, the National Property Fund has been obtaining prices which are 
twice as high, on average, than the official stock exchange prices.
Public tenders are mostly used when significant interests are being 
privatized in companies whose shares are not traded on the capital market, or
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when it can be expected that in such a public competition, it will be possible to 
increase the number of potential buyers, and thus also to increase the selling 
price of the shares offered. The main difference between public tenders and 
“block sales” on the capital market is the extent of information provided by the 
National Property Fund as seller. Whereas in public tender, the company 
whose shares are being sold prepares extensive information for distribution, 
but in block sales, all information must be obtained by the investors 
themselves.
This concerns property which, in contrast to the above group, is not 
owned by the National Property Fund but is still owned by the state some 
property is still managed by state enterprises or other state organizations. In a 
number of cases, the National Property Fund has difficulties in privatizing 
such property. For example, a buyer approved by the government maybe 
unable to present proof of its ability to pay the purchase price. The basic 
strategy of the National Property Fund in such cases is either to complete 
privatization under the terms specified in relevant decision or, when an 
approved decision cannot be implemented for objective reasons. The National 
Property Fund proposes that the decision be amended. Such a change, 
however, must be approved by the authority that had issued the original 
decision (the government, or the Ministry for Management of National
Property and its Privatizaion)47
Andreja B6hm ,op.cil.p.l41
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The privatization methods in use in the Czech Republic do not make it 
possible to combine on a mass scale the process of privatization with centrally 
controlled restructuring processes. It is generally expected that structural 
changes in individual enterprises will be carried out by the new owners.
Within the privatization process, only those enterprises created by 
administrative decisions of communist institutions and whose operations could 
not be economically justified were broken up. Active restructuring controlled 
by the state is only being carried out in several of the most important 
companies included in the category of strategic interest companies included in 
the category of strategic interest companies. An example is the restructuring 
of the petrochemical and refining sector. After a government decision, 
Unipetrol is being built up as a strong holding company which will comprise all 
major enterprises operating in oil transport, processing and distribution of oil 
products. With government approval, a consortium of foreign oil companies is 
involved in the refining subsidiary. Such examples of centrally-controlled 
restructuring being connected with privatization are rather exceptional but also 
exist in the mining and metallurgical sectors.
Among enterprises in the private and social services sectors which 
were included in the privatization process have, in particular, been enterprises 
providing communal services (refuse collection, cleaning and maintenance in 
towns, etc.) companies distributing water, electricity and gas, housing 
enterprises and a certain proportion of health service institutions. In contrast, 
not included were schools (elementary, secondary and institutions of higher
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learning), social institutions (institutions providing care to mentally and 
physically handicapped persons and children), and several other institutions 
of national status (The National Theatre, the National Museum, the Academy 
of Sciences and similar institutions).
No special methods were devised for privatization of the above 
enterprises. In addition, they were privatized by either transformation into 
joint-stock companies and subsequent privatization of their shares, or by 
direct privatization-sale of property or its assignment to the community without 
cost. To by far the biggest extent, communities took part in the privatization of 
the public sector; for the most part they acquired property for free, especially 
property which by its character is associated with community requirements 
rather than business purposes, for example, water distribution, sewerage and 
other systems, property facilitating communal cleaning and maintenance of 
parks, etc.
Some property area of concern is privatization of the health service. 
Included in the privatization process was a majority of outpatient health 
facilities, and a portion of small and medium-sized hospitals. Prior to 
privatization, health facilities were divided into two categories. Category A 
included health facilities which were freely privatizable and category B facility, 
the Ministry of Health set minimum requirements regarding the extent of 
health services which the new owners must provide for a period of at least ten 
years after privatization. In the event that new owners fail to fulfil such an 
obligation, the National Property Fund can impose high financial penalties, -
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and when even this is not sufficient to ensure redress, the National property 
Fund can repossess the property concerned by exercising its retained pre­
emption right, and repeat the privatization process.
Most health establishments were privatized by direct sale on the basis 
of submitted privatization projects. Usually, prices were set at the level of the 
book value of the privatized property, just as in the case of privatization of 
property in other sectors. Where there were several potential buyers of one 
health facility, usually the tenderer was chosen who, according to their 
professional qualifications or business project, best met the requirement of 
health services that are to be provided within the appropriate category of 
health service institutions. Only in the case of most attractive health service 
institutions, for which there were several applicants with comparable 
qualifications or similar business projects, were tenders invited and property 
sold to the tenderer offering the highest price.
In contrast to the other sectors, privatization in the health service was 
supported by the state by means of preferential credit arrangements. Thus 
when a buyer obtained credit from a bank for payment of the purchase price, 
part of the interest payments were defrayed by the State. When a bank, for 
example, granted credit at 15% interest, the buyer paid only 9% and the state 
remaining 6% of the interest. Only in the cases when there was no potential 
buyer, were transfers of health facilities to communities without payment 
approved. In a majority of cases, communities leased such facilities to 
doctors.
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This chapter has attempted to illustrate the scope and depth of 
structural change achieved in the Czech Republic during the ten years since 
the 1989 Velvet Revolution. After this transitional period, the share of private 
sector employment increased from 1 percent in 1989 to 60 per cent at the end 
of 1993 and over 80 per cent by the end of 1995. More than 1 million jobs 
have been created in the small private enterprise/business sector, which was 
almost non-existent five years ago. In the period of 1990-94, many small and 
medium-sized private enterprises were successfully developed. The number 
of private entrepreneurs and small business owners increased from an 
estimated 70.000 in mid-1989 to about 600,000 in mid-1994 in the Czech 
Republic alone.''® The number of companies (limited liability, joint stock and 
public limited companies) in Czechoslovakia went up rapidly during 1991 and 
1992. In the Czech Republic the number is estimated to have doubled 
between January 1993 and July 1994. At the same time, the number of state 
enterprises declined. The pace of decline was relatively moderate at the 
beginning of the reform process, but it took momentum as the so-called large 
scale privatization started. By now, most assets are in private hands.
Privatization in the Czech Republic has correctly been treated as a part 
of a broader process of structural change.The success of privatization in the 
Czech Republic lies in its flexibility. Privatization in this country has mostly 
been distinguished by its comprehensive variety of methods and its speed. 
The Czech Government succeeded very well on their principle of privatizing
Rolph Van der Hoeven, op cit.p. 155 
Saul Eslrin, op cit.p. 157
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as quickly as possible and leave to the owners the restructuring. Mass 
privatization in the Czech Republic resulted in a much more concentrated 
ownership structure than was originally predicted. Control of these firms also 
encouraged restructuring and speeded up the transition to a market economy.
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4. Lessons, Overall Evaluation, Conclusion
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe demonstrated the 
failure of a command economy. The subsequent crash in output and 
employment induced by “shock therapy” has suggested the limits of a laissez 
faire economy. Rather than replace the excesses of communism with 
excesses of capitalism, it was time to lay extreme ideology aside and begin 
the practical work of economic reconstruction.Beginning in the late 1989, 
economic reformers in Eastern Europe began lifting controls on prices, foreign 
exchange restrictions, subsidies to business and barriers to trade. The shock 
treatment did have some beneficial effects. Manufactured exports to the West 
have risen. Small private enterprises have succeeded, and unemployment in 
Warsaw, Budapest and Prague has been practically nil.
That was the good news. The bad news was that in the rest of Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the less developed nations of the 
former East bloc, ten millions of people remain dependent on state-owned 
enterprises that are not competitive under free-market conditions. It was not 
economically feasible simply to shut these enterprises down. In these
’ Alice H.Amsden, Bevond Shock Therapy: The Path To East European Recove_ry, p l8
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circumstances, East European intellectuals, even most social democrats, 
have tended to embrace privatization as part of a radical free-market model.
No nation has ever built a modern industry under the conditions 
imposed on Eastern Europe. The world’s fastest growing economies like 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have tended to follow ways almost opposite 
to those commanded to postsocialist Europe. The practical question was how 
to restructure this old economy. The answer was privatization. Privatization 
was a necessary condition for the market mechanism to work, because it 
holds promise to governments of generating revenues through sales of public 
property. And, privatization helped create a new entrepreneurial middle class 
that values hard work and liberal political democracy.
As was implied in the previous chapters, one of the main purposes of 
privatization in Eastern Europe is to contribute towards the creation of a well 
functioning market economy. It is hard to imagine such an economy without a 
large private sector. A second, not unrelated objective of privatization, is to 
create conditions conductive to raising productive efficiency in all its 
dimensions; such as lowering costs of production, improving product quality 
and variety, improving innovative behaviour. Third, for governments facing 
difficulties in raising revenue and balancing the state budget, privatization can 
provide a means of raising some revenue. Fourth, if revenue considerations 
are not so central, then equity arguments may dictate that privatization should
71
be conducted in such a way that the ownership of former state-owned assets 
should be relatively distributed across the population.®^
Privatization is considered a cornerstone of the transition process for 
all of Eastern Europe. While some countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania 
are still in the process of setting up a fully defined privatization scheme, other 
countries, notably the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland, 
already have their basic systems in place. The discussion on the role of 
privatization in the process of transition focused on the speed of privatization, 
and it was far from clear whether privatization should lead or follow the 
process of transition.Proponents of slow privatization put forward three 
basic arguments.
•  macroeconomic stabilization, domestic price liberalization and 
account convertibility have to precede privatization because 
efficient decisions can only be made on the basis of correct relative 
prices.
• Introduction of competition policies and account convertibility has to 
precede privatization to prevent monopoly profits.
•  Introduction of modern tax systems and accounting procedures, 
and financial and capital market reforms, have to precede
■ ' Saul Estriii, op.cit.p.33
Paul Cook, Colin Kirkpatrick, Privatisation Policy and Performance. International Perspectives, p.36
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privatization to allow for proper enterprise valuation. Proponents of 
fast privatization basically pointed toward the broader 
macroeconomic consequences of continuing to burden the 
economy with a large and inefficient state enterprise sector for 
decades to come.^^
By now it has become widely accepted that the transition from planned 
to market economy, and urgently needed improvements in enterprise 
efficiency are impossible to occur without extensive and rapid privatization. 
This view is reflected in the mass privatization programs that are discussed 
and set up in countries like Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland. Poland for 
example, after initially experimenting for about nine moths with UK style one- 
by-one privatizations, that involve valuations, prospectuses, subscriptions, 
underwriting etc. found it necessary to broaden its approach in the Summer of 
1990 after experiencing very slow progress with its original approach.^'’ With 
all Eastern European countries swiftly implementing macroeconomic 
stabilization policies, domestic price liberalization and current account 
liberalization, arguments for delaying privatization were significantly 
weakened. The rapid progress that was achieved on devising mass 
privatization schemes that would allow for fast nominal divesting of state 
assets while delaying the question of asset valuation, further strengthened 
arguments in favour of a fast and comprehensive privatization.
Hemming, Privatization. p.80 
Paul Cook, op.cit.p.37
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There are elements that are common to east European privatization 
programs, such as the largely demand-determined early privatizations of 
companies in good financial condition. However, only Romania has an explicit 
program for enterprises in good financial health. There are also marked 
differences among East European countries, particularly with respect to the 
acceptance of mass privatization and the acceptance of foreign investment. In 
general, domestic credit in Eastern Europe is severely constrained, 
particularly in relation to that available to potential western buyers. Therefore, 
in the absence of mass privatization schemes, domestic credit constraints 
would make sales to foreign investors almost inevitable. In Hungary, for 
example, the rejection of mass privatization has necessarily meant a strong 
openness to foreign investment. Other countries, particularly those in which 
mass privatization is expected to play an important role, have sometimes 
placed more restrictions on foreign investment. Rigid controls on foreign 
investments have usually been reasoned out by the need to ensure harmony 
of interest between enterprises and nations regarding long-term corporate 
strategies. In Poland, for example, foreign investments require special 
approval by the Agency of Foreign Investment if the par value of the shares 
bought by a foreign investor exceeds 10 per cent of the share capital of the
enterprise 55
The privatization of small enterprises, mostly retail stores and 
enterprises in trade and services, has proceeded with rapid pace across 
Eastern Europe, while privatization of large enterprises, such as mines, still.
f^ S Ministry o f Privatization, Privatiziition Transactions. Poland, 1991
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shipyards, petrochemical complexes, oil refineries and textile factories, has 
been proceeding with much slower speed. This has been due to two main 
reasons.
•  Large enterprises usually have an old obsolete capital stock and employ 
old production technologies, and may therefore be unlikely to attract 
buyers at positive prices.
• Large enterprises account for a big share of employment and production in 
the economy, and privatization or shut-down may be politically difficult.
Still, it is clear that ultimately there may only be two solutions for these 
enterprises: (i) shut-down and liquidation in parts; or (ii) massive investments 
to modernise the capital stock. Given that few local individuals have the 
financial resources to carry out the necessary investment, governments have 
three basic choices;
•  Find ways to attract foreigners on a large scale,
•  Establish diluted share ownership by local individuals via mass 
privatization,
• Break up the existing large-scale enterprises into smaller units that are 
privatized separately.
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The Eastern European privatization experience, as discussed above, 
would seem to lead to a number of preliminary policy lessons for other 
governments wishing to reduce an overextended public sector.
Those who take part in the debates on privatization are frequently 
asked whether they recommend fast or slow privatization. The question is 
constructed in the wrong way. No one would call oneself an advocate of 
slowness. The debate should not be about the speed, but about the decision 
of values, the role assigned to the state, and the assessment of the 
importance of the various forms of ownership and types of owner. Once 
anyone takes a position on these points at issue, the speed to be expected 
arises as a result of that decision. The procedure of privatization should be as 
fast as possible. But it can not be accelerated by some artful trick. Finding 
some intelligent organizational form plus bureaucratic aggressiveness in 
enforcement are not sufficient conditions for fast privatization.
Privatization is a cornerstone of the transition from planned to market 
economy. Therefore, it must be accomplished in a speedy and 
comprehensive fashion. The rapid creation of a legal framework that defines 
ownership rights is clear. Given a variety of policy objectives and a highly 
differentiated demand for the existing portfolio of state assets, the use of a 
broad set of privatization tools helps speed up the process. For example, 
separate privatization programs for small commercial units targeted at 
domestic buyers. Reliance on UK style one-by-one privatization is time
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consuming and slows down the process of transition. Foreign investment 
should generally be welcome.
People are more willing to bear an inevitable burden if they can expect 
tangible benefits. To be socially more acceptable, any privatization scheme 
should have a distributive component. Creating broad-based ownership rights, 
as envisaged under the various mass privatization programs, facilitates 
income policy reform and supports efforts to reform social policy. For the 
same reason, management and employee buy-outs and employee ownership 
programs should be encouraged.
Some local and national government ownership is compatible with the 
establishment of a market economy. Given the enormous size of the public 
sector, the provision of public goods and services as well as selected 
activities in various sectors is likely to continue to be in public hands over the 
medium term.®® Still, given the extent of investments that Eastern European 
economies require to bring their domestic energy, telecommunications, and 
transport sectors up to modern standards which private sector already has. In 
other word, private sector solutions should be encouraged.
It is important to realize that privatization is not an end goal but rather a 
means of accomplishing a larger goal of economic development and 
stability.®  ^ Privatization is therefore an essential, but insufficient element of 
structural reform. Even where mass privatization occurs, and the sell-off
56 Robert Andersen. Privatization and Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe, p.45
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process is accelerated, as in the Czech and Slovak Republics, there is clear 
recognition that this is only the first phase of structural reform.
Structural change and adjustment in the transition countries will be a 
long, drawn out process and both political and public support are limited in 
terms of time. Unlike mass privatization, which capitalized on political capital 
and momentum with striking speed, post privatization structural change and 
adjustment issues will require careful thought and planning.. Comparative 
analysis of the Czech and Slovak, Polish, Russian, and Lithuanian mass 
privatization models indicate that during the initial steps of privatization it is 
better to run the risks of imperfect competition and markets, and to accelerate 
the process, than it is to delay privatization. As we witnessed in the third 
chapter, the mass privatization program in the Czech Republic is complete. 
However, the complexities of enterprise restructuring, corporate governance, 
capital market development and competition policy must be addressed if the 
fruits of the privatization are to be enjoyed.
The Eastern European experience indicated that privatization needs to 
be viewed as a very important part of a more comprehensive reform program. 
This lesson is maybe the most important lesson to draw from experiences to 
date. While privatization has created the underlying base for the development 
of a properly functioning market economy, that base cannot be built upon if 
the appropriate support system is not installed. Therefore, the East European
Ira W.Liebernian, Mass Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. 
p.47
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experiences offer important lessons and serve as valuable guidelines for 
countries about to start on the long path towards free markets.
The importance of privatization in Eastern Europe is measured in both 
quantitative terms (extent in proportion to the initial public sector) and 
qualitative terms(its political acceptance)^®, This can be explained by the 
determinants identified in the following analysis. Privatization is a function of;
1) The degree of democracy (assuming more democracy reduces the 
role of pressure groups and allows tighter control of elites and managers), and 
international intellectual openness, or international control of the national 
economy (IMF, World Bank), possibly due to public finance difficulties and 
international borrowing.
2) Political equilibrium (the level of redistribution demand, the extent of 
satisfaction of this demand through public sectors firm)
supply
3) Public Finance factors, or the instrumental theory of redistribution
I
•  Taxes, interest rates, efficiency, openness of financial markets
• Greater elasticity of supply and demand following openness to 
international trade.
58 Herbert Giersch, Privatization at the End of the Century. .p3
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4) Economic structures and institutions (development of financial 
markets, economic markets, property rights and legal systems, etc.) that 
affect the potential benefits from privatization.
It is apparent from this analysis that a broad political and economic 
equilibrium specifying the determining factors of privatization policy highlights 
the role of genuinely political factors in public choices. Upstream from these 
political factors, however, lie economic factors, either structural or liable to 
change in the shorter term, which, through the optimization pursued by 
political agents, help to explain the unequal success of privatization policies in 
different East European countries.
That is why, it is my view that there is no single best transformation 
strategy for all transforming economies. The best strategy will depend on 
each country’s legacies, initial conditions, and current circumstances. And no 
country can be expected to follow any of the pure models. The actual strategy 
of transformation is likely to combine elements from each, although 
circumstances in a given country may make it more receptive to one of the 
approaches than to another.
In brief, privatization has reached a critical juncture in the former 
Communist bloc. While large swaths of industry have been transferred to the 
private sector in countries like the Czech Republic, private ownership is just 
beginning to have an impact on how firms are managed and also how 
economies perform. In this perspective, there are two important issues in
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assessing the impact of privatization on the transitional economies of Eastern 
Europe.. The first is depoliticization of economic decisions. Politicization was 
widespread in the region, ranging from direct sale oversight of resource 
allocation to outright state intervention. The second important issue is the 
enterprise reform, in the sense that the enterprises should be working better. 
In terms of de-politicization, the picture is a little mixed. In countries that have 
carried out large scale privatization programs the state is undoubtedly not as 
dominant. But even in countries like the Czech Republic, where privatization 
has been pushed very far. The state is still present. Therefore, the de­
politicization goal has only been partially achieved in most countries in the 
region. On the other hand, I believe it is early to assess what the real impact 
of enterprise reform. It is in the long term that one can see the effect of 
privatization.
The most important lesson here, is that privatization has to succeed 
politically. This involves more than giving away assets. After privatization, 
corporate governance institutions have been established for the protection of 
minority interests. Thus as the privatization process, the post privatization 
process must be transparent and fair. Such acceptance is the only hope for 
generating large scale political support for privatization.
During the reform programs in Eastern European countries, 
privatization is always in part a political process, so democratic institutions 
affect privatization. For example, as stated in chapter three, the Czech 
Republic had the largest mass privatization program in the region.
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enfranchising many of its citizens and thus generating a tremendous 
momentum in favour of reform.
In countries where there was no mass privatization, the sale of state 
assets could not generate political support because few people benefited from 
it. For example in Russia, the perception has been that certain groups, rather 
than the population as a whole, have benefited from privatization. Therefore, 
the process has contributed to a split in the society. In Slovakia, privatization 
also benefited specific groups
Technically, an important lesson from the experience in Eastern 
Europe is that, the voucher system privatization works better than outright 
sales of state owned companies. Voucher privatization is the only way to do 
large-scale privatization in the region. The local population has too little 
money and foreign demand is insufficient. The only foreign investors that 
enter these countries are corporations which bring their own management. 
The portfolio money through financial markets is very limited due to the 
countries inadequate financial infrastructure and poor information on 
corporate performance. The only way to privatize large holdings is to start by 
giving shares away. The government is unable to sell these enterprises via 
bloc sale because it does not have enough contacts or expertise, with the 
result that the process is too centralized. They may claim the price is too low 
or too high, the assets is a national treasure.
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On the other hand, when assets are distributed as in the Czech 
Republic, the intermediaries sell on behalf of the beneficiaries of the funds. 
Therefore, many Czech citizens benefit from those sales. Contrast this with 
the situation in Hungary, when the government sold State Owned Enterprises, 
people accused government officials of selling them too cheaply. Then, when 
they raised prices, no buyers appeared with the result that privatization has 
taken much longer. It has to be emphasised that this is the country in the 
region which has had the greatest influx of foreign investment.
At least voucher privatization provides a chance to foster the 
emergence of market institutions. That is much more important from the point 
of view of investment and growth than restructuring a particular enterprise.
A tremendous amount of effort has been spent in Central and Eastern 
Europe to privatize state-owned economies almost completely. Once the state 
has an economic role on a scale such as that it had in Communist Eastern 
Europe, the political interests that develop are so strong that it is truly difficult 
to get the state out of the economy. Therefore, should try as much as possible 
to ensure that the state does not become too involved in their economies. It is 
very difficult to de-politicize these economies. It might even be possible to 
privatize them, but that does not necessarily depoliticize them. Many Latin 
American economies have been mostly privately owned, but the private sector 
had been so intervened with state that the relationship probably affected half 
of those economies until liberalization and other free-market reforms were 
implemented. For example, Brazil once had tremendous import quotas tq
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benefit private the industry. That was not good for the Brazilian economy. This 
is a lesson for which one did not have to go to Eastern Europe. Of course the 
Eastern European communist governments that brought about the present 
economic disaster did not worry about this. In fact, their express goal was to 
make their economies as centralized as possible
In tracing the evolution of privatization and examining the approaches 
and results of some privatization programs, it is essential to keep in mind that 
privatization is fundamentally a political transformation, that is, a change in the 
government's role in the economy and in society as a whole. Because of the 
magnitude of this transformation, it can be accomplished only with great 
difficulty, something that is characteristic of any fundamental change.
This is not to say that privatization is an answer to all economic 
problems or even that it will remedy the problems that it is intended to 
remedy. This is also not to say that a government should not own any 
enterprises. It is important to note that almost all countries have at least some 
SOEs, which are necessary in sectors that do not lend themselves to private 
competition. Basic services, such as energy, water, waste treatment, and the 
like are good examples.
The problems with SOEs develop when they assume too large a role in 
the economy, operating in domains that would be more efficient if left in the 
hands of the private sector. Privatization confronts this problem by removing 
encumbrances that accumulate after years of state ownership, thereby letting
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the private sector unleash its energies and resume its rightful role as the 
engine of economic growth.
For this strategy to be effective, the conditions necessary to support a 
thriving private sector must be in place. This is why privatization will not 
succeed unless it is carried out in conjunction with reforms designed to create 
or strengthen market-based economies. This is also why it is harder to 
privatize in the ex-socialist countries, because they must literally create a 
private sector at the same time that they privatize—truly a formidable journey 
through uncharted waters.
The debate over privatization is fundamentally a political debate. After 
all, in democracies old and new, it is the citizens who must decide what 
functions they want government to perform. When government cuts back, 
individuals and groups who used connections to obtain government support in 
one form or another will use those same connections to impede changes 
perceived as injurious to their interests.
For this reason, privatization requires a great deal of political courage. 
Especially in new and fragile democracies, such courage is hard to come by. 
This suggests that privatization techniques that cultivate and maximize 
political support for the process will have the best chance for success. Even
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with such techniques, however, success will come slowly, with economic 
hardship often the most immediate and noticeable result.
In the end, governments face a difficult balancing act, having to impose 
short-term pain as the price of long-term gain. For citizens looking for a better 
future, particularly in the developing and ex-socialist worlds, the promise of 
long-term gain is a rich one indeed. Privatization offers such promise, along 
with the chance for citizens to become owners and investors in former state 
enterprises and thereby assume greater control over their economic destinies. 
Like their political leaders, they must also exhibit great courage as they meet 
the challenges posed by privatization.
There are grounds for optimism. The course of privatization is not 
ultimately set by the wisdom or stupidity or the strength or weakness of East 
European governments, opposition forces, foreign governments, international 
organizations, or consultants. At most, these groups may slow down or speed 
the events. The process is directed by an irresistible inner force: the inherent 
motivation of the present and future private owners.
Most of the privatization programs implemented thus far have proven to 
be economically successful, but this does not mean that the process of 
privatization has become foolproof.
59 Kazimierz Z.Poznanski, The Evolutionary Transition To Capitalism, p.53
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There are important reasons to conclude that the most challenging 
privatizations have not yet been attempted. For one thing, most governments 
have wisely chosen to privatize the "easy" companies (the healthiest, both 
economically and operationally) first, and have not yet attempted controversial 
privatizations of companies that are obviously over-staffed and excessively 
indebted. Given that these SOEs will require painful financial restructuring and 
massive layoffs before they can attract private buyers, it seems clear that the 
most politically difficult privatizations lie in the future.
In spite of these difficulties, the future of privatization is bright. In 
country after country these programs have yielded greater and more 
immediate economic payoffs, with less economic and political pain than 
expected: investors around the world have demonstrated there is an amazing 
demand for privatized equity. Furthermore, the secondary impacts of 
privatization—which often include greater respect for private property rights 
and individual entrepreneurship—have helped many nations develop the 
infrastructure of a dynamic market economy in a historically compressed time 
frame.
Perhaps the most important reason to be optimistic about 
privatization's future is that the three largest developing countries appear on 
the verge of launching large-scale divestiture programs, and are doing so 
from positions of considerable strength. China, India and Russia, which 
collectively represent over one-third of the world's population and are already 
the third, sixth, and ninth largest economies, respectively, on a purchasing
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power basis, have all experimented with privatization, but in all three cases 
large sections of the economy remain state-owned. The privatization 
programs in these three countries will be truly revolutionary in scale and 
scope. If these programs are successful, they will provide a valuable example 
for many other countries to follow.
Many of these reforms can lead initially to unemployment or a further 
deterioration in the standard of living for a significant segment of the 
population. Although the freeing of prices resulted in stores filled with products 
that had been scarce or unavailable under the communist regime, it also 
meant high inflation and consequent reduction of wages or pensions. A 
popular joke of the time summed up the situation nicely; “Under communism, 
we had money, but there was nothing to buy. Under capitalism, everything is 
there to buy but we have no money.”
I suppose the sentence of Winston Churchill summarises the result of 
transformation and privatization efforts in Eastern Europe in a perfect way; 
"the inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings; the 
inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries. "
There is always a danger in speaking about “East European 
Privatization” because, there are as many different stories as there are 
countries, each with a slightly different economic and political starting point.
60 Richard Rose, William Misler & Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives, p.86
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culture and history. It is important to identify that across the region the 
majority of formerly state-owned enterprises are now in private hands. And 
more importantly, states that have made the greatest progress in creating 
market economies are also the seven countries that have made the greatest 
progress in consolidating their democratic transitions, in other words in 
becoming liberal democracies.
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